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For the last 30 years, the United States’ human space program has been focused on low 
Earth orbit exploration and operations with the Space Shuttle and International Space 
Station programs.  After over 40 years, the U.S. is again working to return humans 
beyond Earth orbit.  To do so, NASA is developing a new launch vehicle and spacecraft 
to provide this capability.  The launch vehicle is referred to as the Space Launch System 
(SLS) and the spacecraft is called Orion.  The new launch system is being developed with 
an abort system that will enable the crew to escape launch failures that would otherwise 
be catastrophic as well as probabilistic design requirements set for probability of loss of 
crew (LOC) and loss of mission (LOM).  In order to optimize the risk associated with 
designing this new launch system, as well as verifying the associated requirements, 
NASA has developed a comprehensive Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) of the 
integrated ascent phase of the mission that includes the launch vehicle, spacecraft and 
ground launch facilities.   
 
Given the dynamic nature of rocket launches and the potential for things to go wrong, 
developing a PRA to assess the risk can be a very challenging effort.  Prior to launch and 
after the crew has boarded the spacecraft, the risk exposure time can be on the order of 
three hours.  During this time, events may initiate from either the spacecraft, the launch 
vehicle, or the ground systems, thus requiring an emergency egress from the spacecraft to 
a safe ground location or a pad abort via the spacecraft’s launch abort system.  Following 
launch, again either the spacecraft or the launch vehicle can initiate the need for the crew 
to abort the mission and return home.  Obviously, there are thousands of scenarios whose 
outcome depends on when the abort is initiated during ascent and how the abort is 
performed.  This includes modeling the risk associated with explosions and benign 
system failures that require aborting a spacecraft under very dynamic conditions, 
particularly in the lower atmosphere, and returning the crew home safely.  This paper will 
provide an overview of the PRA model that has been developed of this new launch 
system, including some of the challenges that are associated with this effort.   
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I. Introduction 
 
With the retirement of the Space Shuttle in 2011, NASA has been developing a new 
launch vehicle and spacecraft to provide the return of the United States to deep space.  
Along with a new objective to go beyond Low Earth Orbit for the first time in over 40 
years, the new launch system is being developed with an abort system that will enable the 
crew to escape launch failures that would otherwise be catastrophic.  In order to optimize 
the risk associated with designing this new launch system, NASA has developed a 
comprehensive PRA of the integrated system, including the launch vehicle, spacecraft 
and ground launch facilities.  Given the dynamic nature of rocket launches and potential 
for things to go wrong, developing a PRA model to assess the risk is a challenging effort.  
This includes modeling the risk associated with explosions and aborting a spacecraft 
under very dynamic conditions, particularly in the lower atmosphere.  This paper 
provides an overview of the PRA model that has been developed of this new launch 
system, including some of the challenges that are associated with this effort. 
 
II. Description of Mission and Elements1 
 
The analysis was based on the High Lunar Orbit (HLO) Design Reference Mission 
(DRM), which is a 14 day crewed mission planned for the early 2020’s as Exploration 
Mission-2 (EM-2).  The scope of the analysis to date has been focused on the ascent 
portion of the mission, starting at approximately three hours prior to launch when the 
crew has ingressed the vehicle and ends with successful insertion into a stable orbit.  
Future updates to the analysis include the in-space and Earth Entry, Descent, Landing 
(EDL) and Recovery portions of the mission.  The ascent abort portions of the model are 
assessed to splashdown. 
 
The SLS is the heavy lift capability necessary to support a flexible path approach.  The 
SLS provides the mass to orbit and energy levels necessary to place exploration elements 
(e.g. Orion) into Low Earth Orbit (LEO) for transfer to higher orbits and beyond. 
The SLS provides an evolvable configuration to meet the needs of the capability driven 
framework in an affordable manner.  The initial SLS configuration provides a liquid 
oxygen/liquid hydrogen (LOX/LH2) Core Stage (CS) with two Solid Rocket Boosters 
(SRBs) to place 70 metric tons (t) into LEO.  This SLS configuration also employs the 
Interim Cryogenic Propulsion Stage (ICPS), a LOX/LH2 based element that provides an 
initial capability sufficient to perform the early Tactical DRMs, such as the HLO DRM.  
To support early operational missions, the SLS evolves with a block upgrade approach to 
a 105-t mass to orbit configuration using the Core Stage with advanced boosters.  SLS 
supports longer term architectural DRMs with a 130-t mass to orbit configuration by 
adding a propulsion element to the 105-t configuration.  
 
The Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV) is a pressurized, crewed element that 
transports up to four crew members (evolvable to six) from the Earth’s surface to exo-
LEO destinations or staging points and brings the crew members safely back to the 
Earth’s surface at the end of a mission.  The MPCV provides all services necessary to 
support the crew members while onboard for shorter duration (1-21 days) missions or 
until they are transferred to another vehicle for longer duration missions. 
The MPCV consists of a Crew Module (CM), a Service Module (SM), Spacecraft 
Adaptor (SA), and a Launch Abort System (LAS).  The CM provides a habitable 
pressurized volume to support crew members and cargo during all phases of a given 
mission - from Launch Operations to Earth Entry, Descent, Landing (EDL) and 
Recovery.  The SM provides services to the CM in the form of propulsion, consumables 
storage, heat rejection and power generation.  The LAS provides an abort capability to 
safely transport the CM away from the launch vehicle stack in the event of an emergency 
on the launch pad or during ascent.  The SM also provides some abort capability for 
higher altitude aborts.  The abort system was a major focus of this analysis. 
 
Ground Systems Development and Operations (GSDO) provides common infrastructure, 
and services to perform processing, launch, and recovery of flight elements.  These 
capabilities include receiving, ground processing, integration, integrated and interface 
testing, vehicle servicing, launch operations, recovery, de-integration, refurbishment, 
disposal, emergency egress/escape, and contingency flight crew rescue/crew module 
retrieval operations.  
 
Finally, there are several different abort modes that are available to save the crew in the 
event of a life threatening failure.  MPCV Mode 1 abort (i.e., LAS Abort) capability is 
provided by the Orion LAS and may be performed any time after the LAS is armed on 
the launch pad until LAS jettison during CS ascent.  Prior to LAS arming on the pad, 
emergency egress using a slide wire system is the only way to try to save the crew.  Post-
LAS arming and prior to launch, both emergency egress and LAS abort are available to 
the crew, with the choice depending on the failure.  The LAS pulls the CM away rapidly 
during early parts of ascent in the lower atmosphere.  
 
At higher altitudes, the SM is used to try to save the crew.  However, given its lower 
thrust capability compared to the LAS, it pulls away from the SLS much more slowly and 
also requires the launch vehicle to terminate its thrust first prior to separation.  MPCV 
Mode 2 aborts (i.e., Untargeted Abort Splashdown (UAS)) are performed using the Orion 
Crew and Service Module (CSM) and may be performed any time after LAS jettison 
through completion of the ICPS insertion maneuver into a stable orbit.  MPCV Mode 2 
does not use the SM thrust.  The spacecraft separation mechanism springs provide the 
initial separation impulse, after which the only active propulsion required from the SM is 
a short Auxiliary (Aux) thruster burn to provide sufficient clearance of the Orion 
spacecraft from the SLS.  
 
MPCV Mode 4 abort (i.e., Abort to Orbit (ATO)) capability is provided by the Orion 
CSM and may be performed once sufficient orbital energy exists such that SM-only 
propulsion can place Orion in a safe obit while preserving the capability to perform an 
eventual deorbit burn.  MPCV Mode 4 aborts are available until completion of the 
nominal ICPS insertion maneuver into a stable orbit.  For EM-2, the first MPCV Mode 4 
capability exists prior to MPCV Mode 2 aborts impacting Africa.  Unlike MPCV Mode 2 
aborts, MPCV Mode 4 leverages the SM Orbital Maneuvering System (OMS) engine and 
auxiliary thrusters after separation from SLS to achieve an orbital target.  
In all abort cases, the MPCV landing systems (e.g., chutes, etc.) must operate to ensure a 
successful abort and safe recovery of the crew.  Higher altitude aborts also may require 
use of the Thermal Protection System (TPS) and require a deorbit burn (Mode 4 aborts 
only).  
 
III. Overview of Model 
 
The Integrated Design Analysis Cycle 2a (IDAC-2a) Cross PRA (XPRA) is a linked 
event tree – fault tree model.  The event trees were constructed using the SAPHIRE2 tool 
by the XPRA Team (XPRAT) based on the major mission milestones of the current EM-
2 mission of record’s pre-launch and ascent phases, along with their associated aborts.  A 
Cross Program PRA Methodology Document3 was created to guide all participating 
programs in development of their models for input into the IDAC-2a XPRA model.  This 
methodology document is based on standard PRA practices, including PRA practices 
used in the nuclear industry.  
 
Fault trees developed by PRA teams from the SLS, GSDO, and Orion MPCV programs 
were linked in the integrated model.  In addition, the XPRAT created fault trees to 
integrate the abort performance simulation results from the MPCV Flight Performance 
Group and Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) inputs into the abort phases of the model. 
 
The IDAC-2a XPRA consists of four event trees that are linked to hundreds of fault trees 
through decision logic and event tree rules as illustrated in Figure 1.  The four event trees 
include major timeline events, or top events, for the pre-launch, nominal ascent, ascent 
abort, and abort EDL mission phases.  Fault trees for Orion, SLS, and GSDO are mapped 
to the top events.  These fault trees represent Orion, SLS, or GSDO system failures that 
result in a LOC, a LOM, or an abort scenario.  In all of the event trees, there are instances 
where multiple fault trees are mapped to a single top event.  For these particular 
instances, event tree rules assign specific fault trees to the corresponding top event branch 
based on a particular failure condition that has occurred.  
 
The four end-states that exist in the IDAC-2a XPRA SAPHIRE model are as follows:  
LOC, LOM, LOMAT and OK.  LOC is defined as death of, or permanently debilitating 
injury to, one or more crew members; LOM is defined as the inability to complete any 
significant/primary mission objective; LOMAT, which is not shown in the figure, is 
defined as the abortable failure scenarios initiated by Orion, SLS or GSDO that occur 
during the Prelaunch and Ascent phases that will ultimately result in either LOC or LOM, 
and is used in off-line calculations of conditional abort LOC; and OK is defined as the 
successful completion of all nominal mission phases. 
 
Key inputs to the model are the SLS and Orion conditional ascent abort probabilities.  If 
the abort environment (e.g., debris, blast, fireball) created by an SLS failure exceeds the 
capability of the Orion, it is captured in SLS fault tree logic that maps directly to LOC in 
the integrated ascent LOC model.  These conditional abort probabilities are calculated 
separately outside the model based on off-line time-dependent analysis using a  
 
 
 
Figure 1:  XPRA Event Tree Logic 
 
combination of physical models, engineering-level physics models, and empirical data 
results from historical tests to characterize the prevailing conditions to which the crewed 
vehicle is exposed.  Probabilistic estimates for successful abort attempts are based on the 
failure environment conditions, the vehicle design thresholds and capabilities, and the 
amount of warning time provided.  
 
MPCV Guidance, Navigation and Control (GN&C) abort performance factors, provided 
via the MPCV/SLS Abort Integration Team (MSAIT), and SLS ascent failure scenarios, 
otherwise known as LOM scenarios which are mapped to Orion LOM Abortable (LOMA) 
Initial Conditions (ICs), are combined through logic and rules in the model for successful 
abort attempts.  The Orion GN&C abort performance factors account for the probability 
that the Orion could fail to successfully fly out the abort trajectory given that it has 
survived the initial environment generated by a major failure of the SLS, Orion, or 
ground systems.  Fault trees from these programs are combined and linked to the 
appropriate top event branches in the event trees.  These combinations help to determine 
the most significant integrated ascent abort LOC risks.  
 
Another major input into the model is HRA.  In some cases, it was determined that 
automatic abort triggers were impractical or undesirable, thus manual aborts by the flight 
crew or ground would be required in these cases.  Human error events were identified in 
these cases and the XPRAT created fault trees to integrate the HRA inputs into the abort 
phases of the model.  This input is illustrated in Figure 2.  Given the immaturity in the 
understanding of the operations of the vehicle at this early stage of the design,  
 
 
 
a screening methodology was utilized by the XPRAT to quantify any human error events 
that were identified.  The screening analysis assigns conservative values to the human 
actions based on a basic characterization of the action as a function of the time available 
for the human to identify the failure, decide what to do, and act on that decision, along 
with consideration of adverse condition like environment and stress.  Human error events 
identified in this analysis were provided to the crew and operations for review.  At this 
point in the design, all of the assessments are considered preliminary.  
 
For the pre-launch part of the model, emergency egress is also a crew survival option, 
and is the only option prior to LAS arming as described earlier.  For those failures which 
would lead to an emergency egress, an emergency egress model was included to account 
for the LOC due to a failed emergency egress.  
 
Event tree rules were used extensively in this model.  There are three principle uses of 
event tree rules in the IDAC-2a XPRA:  to substitute one top event for another given a 
special condition, to assign different fault trees whenever multiple-split branches are used 
for any particular top event, and to prevent the creation of nonsensical sequences and 
their cut sets.   
 
IV.   Applications of the Model 
 
As stated earlier, this model serves two important purposes.  First, it is used to verify 
whether the integrated system is meeting LOC/LOM requirements.  There are several 
requirements which the model serves to verify.  These include ascent LOC and LOM 
requirements for SLS, along with ascent LOC and conditional abort LOC requirements 
for MPCV.  Perhaps more importantly, this model also provides a capability of showing 
risks of the integrated system that the individual program models (SLS or Orion) do not 
capture that can support a risk-informed design process.  This information can be used for 
example to optimize the abort triggers to try to maximize the risk reduction achievable 
with the abort system.  It can also point out areas of uncertainty where our knowledge of 
the design, operations and/or interfaces is not well understood, and more analysis and/or 
testing needs to be performed to better understand them.  It can also point out areas that 
are very sensitive to assumptions made regarding the model, for example the abort initial 
conditions associated with some failure scenarios.   
 
V.   Challenges 
 
Several challenges have been encountered in the development of the ascent abort model.  
First, there are some issues associated with using the PRA in the design phase as opposed 
to the operational phase.  For example, in trying to model human error for ascent aborts, 
HRA screening analysis was used to populate the human error events in the model 
because the operations and training are either very immature or non-existent at this point.  
As a consequence, these events show up as very high risk drivers.  This can have the 
unintended consequence of causing outside stakeholders to be skeptical of the PRA and 
unwilling to use it.  
 
Trying to integrate very complex and dynamic events, which are not well understood, 
pose another challenge to this effort.  For example, for some failure cases such as thrust 
vector control failures, very detailed simulations have been performed to understand the 
initial conditions at abort so that the response of the aborting vehicle can be better 
characterized.  However, for other failure cases such as vehicle explosions, the abort 
initial conditions are not as well understood or easy to model.  Thus, a more subjective 
approach has been used until these scenarios can be better modeled.  
 
Following a self-integration approach across these NASA programs yields some 
variations in modeling.  For example, some programs attempted to model down to a level 
of detail not supported by data.  This is partially in response to the types of questions 
being asked of the PRA by the decision makers, for example abort trigger trade studies.  
In these cases, the analysts use engineering judgment to come up with estimates of the 
events.  In order to deal with this situation, the analysts should consider performing 
sensitivity analyses on these events and/or look at the importance measures associated 
with these events.  For those events that are high importance and/or the model is very 
sensitive to the estimates of these events, more analysis and/or testing may be necessary 
to validate or better characterize the assumptions that went into these estimates.  The 
other alternative is to model at a higher level where data exists.    
 
Given multiple programs with or without a LOC requirement, one must assign an owner 
for the risk.  In many cases, such as pre-launch, the programs are so intimately integrated 
that it is very difficult, if not impossible, to separate the risks and assign to the various 
programs.  For most failures, the programs have agreed to define the capabilities of the 
Orion to environment generated by SLS, which are then used to assign risk between the 
programs, depending on the likelihood of exceeding these defined limits.  However, in 
recent iterations of the model, new situations have been identified that may need to be 
defined in order to assign the risk to the various programs.  For example, for manual 
aborts where sufficient time for the crew or ground to respond to a failure is not 
available, the program that initiates the risk becomes the owner.  The other situation that 
could arise from this LOC requirement by program is that it could actually be 
counterproductive and actually result in a higher overall risk to the integrated system in 
order to meet the individual program requirements.  So far this has not been an issue. 
 
Finally, reviewing a model of this size and complexity is not trivial, particularly when the 
analysts are faced with challenging schedules and limited resources.  In trying to review a 
model of this size, it is attempted to verify there are no errors in the integrated model by 
doing both vertical and horizontal checks of the model, including checking for missing 
sequences, comparison with the program model LOC/LOM results, missing flag events, 
rules, basic event values, and so on.  It is possible that some errors could slip through the 
cracks.  The main objective is to make sure that any errors that do would not significantly 
impact the results of the model.  It is believed that all major modeling errors have been 
identified and corrected to date. 
 
VI.  Conclusion 
 
Given these challenges, it is believed that this model represents a very useful tool to help 
verify LOC/LOM requirements and to support trade studies to optimize the allocation of 
resources to obtain the most risk reduction within all other constraints.  The model will be 
expanded in future updates to include additional mission phases, such as in-space and 
nominal EDL, and challenges identified in the previous section will be addressed to 
improve the overall quality of the model.   
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